FREQUENT FLYERS AT THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT BEGINS TO TAKE THE EXPERIENCE OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS INTO ACCOUNT IN MIRANDA CASES.

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ABSTRACT:

Frequent fliers in the criminal justice context are a very active group of offenders. Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the Supreme Court decided four cases interpreting Miranda that featured frequent fliers: Montejo v. Louisiana, Florida v. Powell, Maryland v. Shatzer, and Berghuis v. Thompkins. The original purpose underlying the Miranda decision was to reduce the likelihood that suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in an intimidating atmosphere by focusing on law enforcement actions. The defendants in these four cases were familiar with interrogation procedures employed by the police and, thus, were presumably less susceptible to be coerced by the hostile and intimidating environments of a custodial interrogation. The result in individual cases is a growing acceptance by courts – implicit in the Supreme Court, but explicit in state and lower federal courts -- that a waiver of Miranda rights by a suspect with an extensive criminal history is more likely to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The result in more general terms signals a potential shift in Miranda doctrine by the Supreme Court: instead of relying on a prophylactic rule to prevent abusive police tactics, the Supreme Court is starting to focus on whether a particular defendant was coerced by the tactics used by the police. The practical implications of this focus appears to be a willingness to allow greater leeway to police, and greater use of aggressive police tactics when dealing with suspects with criminal experience. While it seems unlikely that Miranda will be directly overruled, the recent decisions and an increased focus on the criminal background of suspects suggests that the existing Miranda rules will continue to be subtly abandoned in favor of a more subjective test focusing on whether a statement is the result of coercion.

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INTRODUCTION

Frequent fliers in the criminal justice context are a “very active group of minor offenders who cycle through local correctional institutions on a regular basis.”¹ Police and prosecutors use

¹ M. Chandler Ford, Californian Journal of Health Promotion 2005, Volume 3, Issue 2, 61-71. (“These persons, whom practitioners have labeled frequent fliers, are characterized by their high-volume of jail admissions and discharges. In most cases, these offenders have dozens of arrests and jail admissions – but some high-demand users have been admitted more than a hundred times.”). See also http://www.doubletongued.org/index.php/dictionary/frequent_flier (visited November 4, 2010) (defining frequent flier as “a repeat offender; a recidivist; (generally) a person who regularly or habitually uses or takes advantage of a service”).
the term generically, often referring to a defendant with many prior arrests as a “frequent flier.”\textsuperscript{2}

Frequent fliers are, presumably, familiar with interrogation procedures employed by the police and are less likely to be coerced by the hostile and intimidating environments of a custodial interrogation. In particular, because they are familiar with police procedure and tactics, the psychological effects of police interrogation tactics – which are the result of isolating suspects and cutting them off from the outside world – have a less significant effect on frequent fliers.\textsuperscript{3}

The original purpose underlying the \textit{Miranda} decision, thus, was to reduce the likelihood that suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in an intimidating atmosphere.\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Miranda} was intended to limit what was thought to be the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations, and in \textit{Miranda} the Court established a set of “procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.

Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the Supreme Court decided four cases interpreting \textit{Miranda} that featured frequent fliers: \textit{Montejo v. Louisiana},\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Florida v.}


\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Compare} Russell L. Weaver, \textit{Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential Paradox}, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 179 (2010) (noting that confessions may be unreliable because “suspects may be surrounded by the police, isolated in an interrogation room, cut off from the outside world, and not fully aware of their rights or the legal system. When a suspect is scared, the suspect may be more likely to make incriminating statements by mistake.”).


\textsuperscript{5} 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)
In all four cases, the suspects presumably were familiar with the *Miranda* warnings, were aware that the police would honor the *Miranda* warnings, were familiar with police tactics, and, as a result, were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation of custodial interrogation. In deciding these four cases, the Court could infer that the suspects were less likely to make a coerced confession as a result of the psychological effects of police interrogation techniques. In other words, while the original *Miranda* decision held that the atmosphere of a custodial interrogation generates “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” these later decisions shift the focus from the atmosphere to whether the individual suspects were actually compelled to make incriminating statements. As a result, the Court was able to continue a process of limiting the scope of the original *Miranda* decision by focusing more responsibility of the subjective knowledge of suspects rather than the actions of law enforcement.

The four recent *Miranda* Court’s decisions all begin with the generally uncontested premise that the rights described in *Miranda* may be waived. While the validity of a waiver is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set of factors for courts to consider in determining whether a suspect's waiver was voluntary. In particular, the Court has not explicitly considered this factor in determining whether a waiver was voluntary. However, lower federal and state courts interpreting the voluntariness of a

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6 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010)
7 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010)
8 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010)
9 384 U.S. at 467.
confession have explicitly included criminal background among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness.

This article examines the increased consideration of the criminal background of suspects, whether implicit or explicit, by the Supreme Court and lower courts in determining whether a Miranda waiver is made in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner. Part I of the article reviews existing Miranda doctrine and the factors considered by the Supreme Court in determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Part II of this article reviews the four Miranda cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. Part III of this article examines the common theme of experienced defendants in the four cases, and proceeds to review the manner in which lower courts have taken the criminal background of suspects into account in determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Finally, in Part IV, I examine the implications for the future of the Miranda doctrine as the Supreme Court considers the subjective knowledge of suspects in determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

I. CURRENT VIEWS OF MIRANDA

Miranda, as currently understood, protects the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the accused.10 The Fifth Amendment provides protection against compelled self-incrimination,


Although Miranda has its roots in the Fifth Amendment, the case is now understood as establishing rules to protect rights under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Miranda Court described the original issue before the Court as follows:

[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself 384 U.S. at 439 (emphasis supplied). In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), the Court explained that the required warnings adequately inform defendants not only of their Fifth Amendment rights, but of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well. See also U.S. v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that Miranda has “roots in the Fifth and Sixth
providing that “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” 11 Meanwhile, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. 12 The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 13

The Court established in Miranda a set of “procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.” 14 While the possibility of physical coercion remained a

11 U.S. Const. amend V.

12 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (holding that court must reverse a criminal defendant's conviction “without any specific showing of prejudice to defendant when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.”).

The Supreme Court has stated that a critical stage is “a step of a criminal proceeding ... that holds significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002). A critical stage is one at which “[a]vailable defenses may be [ ] irretrievably lost,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961), and “where rights are preserved or lost,” White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963). However, interrogation is one of the critical stages. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986).


13 U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (“[T]he right to counsel ... means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” (quotations omitted).)

fear, the focus of the Court in *Miranda* was on the psychological effects of custodial interrogation. The Court stated, for example, that it was concerned that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or the specific stratagems [of police], the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”\(^\text{15}\) The original purpose underlying the Miranda decision, thus, was to “reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation.”\(^\text{16}\) *Miranda* accomplished this purpose through a preemptive effort to alleviate the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations by informing or reminding the subject of the interrogation of the rights to silence and counsel. In this way, the focus of *Miranda* was on police conduct, not on whether a particular suspect was subject to psychological coercion in a particular case.

The warnings required by Miranda are part of the popular culture, and well known to all Americans with a television set.\(^\text{17}\) Accordingly, prior to any custodial interrogation, a defendant must be informed:

[1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an

\(^\text{15}\) 384 U.S. at 456.

\(^\text{16}\) New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). *See also* Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 750-51 (7th Cir.1998) (“The relevant constitutional principles are aimed not at protecting people from themselves but at curbing abusive practices by public officers.”).

\(^\text{17}\) U.S. v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“As every television viewer knows, an officer ordinarily may not interrogate a suspect who is in custody without informing her of her Miranda rights.”); U.S. v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that term “Miranda Warnings” “is commonly used, both in court and in television shows, to describe the ritual prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona.”); U.S. v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR-45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344 (D. Utah, April 8, 2010) (defendant testified “that he was very aware of his Miranda rights because of television . . .”). *See also* Russell Dean Covey, *Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution*, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 761 (2006-2007) (“Not only did television make the *Miranda* warnings famous, its adoption of *Miranda* as an icon of criminal procedure may be main the reason *Miranda* is good law today.”).
attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.\textsuperscript{18}

Although the content of the four warnings is necessary, no “magic words” or specific language has been required by the Court.\textsuperscript{19} Rather, the only requirement is that the \textit{Miranda} warnings “clearly inform[ ]” the individual of his rights.\textsuperscript{20} In determining whether law enforcement officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, courts are not required to examine the words employed “as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by \textit{Miranda}'.”\textsuperscript{21}

All that is required is that the warning reasonably conveys the contents of the four rights specified in \textit{Miranda}.

There are clear consequences to law enforcement of the failure to follow the procedure set forth in \textit{Miranda}. "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."\textsuperscript{22} This aspect of the \textit{Miranda} decision is often the subject of the most impassioned debate. Critics of the decision have for a long time claimed that valid confessions are excluded because of the failure of police to follow proper procedures and, as a result, the guilty to free. In 1986, for example, a Wisconsin judge wrote that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence seemed to be “more intent on

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Powell --- U.S. ---- at ----, 130 S.Ct. 1195, ---- L.Ed.2d ---- at ----, 2010 WL 605603 at *7} (citing \textit{Miranda}, 384 U.S. at 479).
  \item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{See California v. Prysock}, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam) (“no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [\textit{Miranda’s}] strictures,”); \textit{Duckworth}, 492 U.S. at 203 ("The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by \textit{Miranda}."); \textit{Thai v. Mapes}, 412 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2005) ("the Court has recognized that there are no magic words that automatically satisfy \textit{Miranda’s} constitutional concerns").
  \item \textsuperscript{20}384 U.S. at 471, \textit{quoting Prysock}, 453 U.S. at 361.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Duckworth}, 492 U.S., at 203 (quoting \textit{Prysock}, 453 U.S. at 361.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Miranda}, 384 U.S. at 444.
\end{itemize}
finding reasons to let admittedly guilty criminals escape punishment than in doing justice for society.”\(^\text{23}\) And, in 2000, Professor Cassel argued on the NewsHour that “70,000 violent criminal cases each year go unsolved because of Miranda.”\(^\text{24}\)

A. **ASSERTION OF RIGHTS: EDWARDS, MINNICK AND DAVIS**

In *Edwards v. Arizona*\(^\text{25}\) and *Minnick v. Mississippi*,\(^\text{26}\) the Supreme Court addressed the actions law enforcement must take after suspects assert their *Miranda* rights.

The defendant in *Edwards* had been arrested at his home on a warrant for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.\(^\text{27}\) At the police station, the detectives provided the defendant with his *Miranda* warnings. The defendant acknowledged that that he understood his rights, provided a taped statement presenting an alibi defense, and indicated that he wanted to negotiate “a deal.”\(^\text{28}\) The Defendant then indicated that “I want an attorney before making a deal;” the police stopped any questioning.\(^\text{29}\) However, the next morning, two detectives came to the jail to interview the defendant. The detectives provided the defendant with his *Miranda* warnings.\(^\text{30}\) The detectives were able to obtain a confession from the defendant by playing a portion of his accomplice’s statement. Based, in part, on this statement, the defendant was convicted.\(^\text{31}\)

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\(^{27}\) 451 U.S. at 478.

\(^{28}\) 451 U.S. at 479.

\(^{29}\) 451 U.S. at 479.

\(^{30}\) 451 U.S. at 479.

\(^{31}\) 451 U.S. at 479.
The Supreme Court held that the use of the defendant’s second statement violated his Constitutional rights. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the right to counsel required “special protection,” and that in order to provide that special protection additional safeguards would be necessary. The Court then set forth what has become known as the “Edwards rule”: when an accused requests an attorney, he may not be questioned unless an attorney has been made available or the accused initiates the conversation.

The Supreme Court revisited the Edwards rule in Minnick. In Minnick, the defendant was accused of, among other crimes, murdering two people in Mississippi after escaping from a local jail. The defendant was arrested in California four months later. The defendant claimed that, while in jail in California, he was mistreated by the police. He was then interviewed by the FBI. The FBI special agents provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings. The defendant provided a brief statement and told the special agents to “come back . . . when I have a lawyer,” and that he would make a more complete statement with his lawyer present.

The FBI special agents ended the interview and a court-attorney met with the defendant. A few days later, a sheriff’s deputy from Mississippi arrived in California and interviewed the defendant. The defendant was provided with his Miranda warnings; he proceeded to provide a statement to the deputy sheriff. Based on the inculpatory statements to

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32 451 U.S. at 484-85.
33 451 U.S. at 485. Cf Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (suspect who had invoked his right to counsel initiated conversation while being transported by asking officer “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”).
34 498 U.S. at 148. The defendant, along with a co-defendant, escaped from a local jail and broke into a mobile home. During the course of the burglary, the men were interrupted by the owner and another man, accompanied by an infant. The two adults were murdered. Two women who subsequently arrived at the mobile home were held at gunpoint, then bound hand and foot. Id.
35 498 U.S. at 148.
36 498 U.S. at 148.
37 498 U.S. at 148.
the deputy, and other evidence, the defendant was convicted to two counts of murder and sentenced to death.\(^{38}\)

The *Minnick* Court explained that Edwards was “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights” and that the *Edwards* rule was intended to ensure that “any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures.”\(^{39}\) For this reason, the Court believed that the presence of counsel prevents coercion and that the *Edwards* rule’s purpose is served by an interpretation that after a suspect has requested counsel, just the opportunity to consult with counsel is insufficient; instead, “the authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence.”\(^{40}\) This interpretation was justified by the view that meeting with an attorney would not eliminate the inherently coercive pressures of custody or the possibility of abusive tactics by the police.\(^{41}\) The Court was also concerned that suspects may not fully understand their rights by just meeting with, or consulting, an attorney.\(^{42}\) The Court concluded: “when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present,

\(^{38}\) 498 U.S. at 148.


\(^{40}\) 498 U.S. at 152.

\(^{41}\) 498 U.S. at 154.

\(^{42}\) 498 U.S. at 154. The Court explained:

Consultation is not a precise concept, for it may encompass variations from a telephone call to say that the attorney is en route, to a hurried interchange between the attorney and client in a detention facility corridor, to a lengthy in-person conference in which the attorney gives full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might be covered in further interrogations.

498 U.S. at 155.
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” The Court emphasized that this rule was not intended to undermine the principle of “individual responsibility” inherent in the decision by suspects to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive their *Miranda* rights, even after counsel has been requested. The Court maintained the ability of suspects to waive their *Miranda* rights after counsel has been requested, so long as the suspects initiate the conversations.

The Court considered the language from the defendant necessary to make the protections of *Edwards* and *Minnick* applicable in *Davis v. United States*. In *Davis*, the Supreme Court the defendant was a suspect in a murder investigation conducted by the Naval Investigative Service. The defendant was interviewed at the NIS office and, after receiving the appropriate warnings required by military law, waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing. After about ninety minutes of questioning, the defendant said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The NIS interviewers reminded the defendant of his rights, and he continued the interview for another hour before stating, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.”

In reviewing whether the defendant’s initial statement constituted an invocation of *Miranda* rights for *Edwards* and *Minnick* purposes, the Court concluded instructed lower courts to conduct an “objective inquiry” into whether the statement . . . can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” The Court limited this inquiry, however, by holding that a “reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal” is not

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43 498 U.S. at 152.
44 498 U.S. at 155.
45 498 U.S. at 156.
46 512 U.S. 452 (1994)
47 512 U.S. at 455.
48 512 U.S. at 455
49 512 U.S. at 459.
sufficient to trigger *Miranda* rights and require a cessation of the custodial interview.\(^{50}\) Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the *Davis* Court explained:

> The rationale underlying *Edwards* is that the police must respect a suspect's wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity," because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.\(^{51}\)

The Court acknowledged that this rule could “disadvantage some suspects who -- because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons -- will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”\(^{52}\) However, the Court believed that the loss of legitimate confessions that might be not be obtained from a tighter rule outweighed this concern.\(^{53}\)

### B. WAIVER INQUIRY

The rights described in *Miranda* may be waived by the subject of a custodial interrogation. In *Miranda* the Court held that a “defendant may waive effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and

\(^{50}\) 512 U.S. at 459. *But see United States v. Plugh*, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) ("*Davis* does not instruct courts how to analyze an initial invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights following the *Miranda* warnings where no waiver occurred. In our view, *Davis* only provides guidance for circumstances in which a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights.").


\(^{52}\) 512 U.S at 460-61.

\(^{53}\) 512 U.S. at 461
There is a presumption against waiver, of which the Government may overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.\textsuperscript{55}

The validity of a waiver must be assessed by a reviewing court on the “totality of the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{56} The prosecution must present evidence that the defendant was aware of “the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”\textsuperscript{57} The waiver inquiry has two dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.\textsuperscript{58}

The Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set of factors for courts to consider in determining whether a suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The limit of the guidance provided by the Court is that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview and waiver must reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.\textsuperscript{59}


Some analysts have suggested that because of the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the Court has employed a different waiver standard. \textit{See e.g.} Geoffrey Sweeney, \textit{Casenote: If You Want It You Had Better Ask For It: How Montejo v. Louisiana Permits Law Enforcement to Sidestep the Sixth Amendment}, 55 Loy. L. Rev. 619, 621 (2009). However, the Supreme Court recently held that the waiver analysis is the same whether the suspect is waiving \textit{Miranda} rights under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. \textit{Berghuis v. Thompkins}, 130 S.Ct. at (“. . . there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the \textit{Miranda} right to remain silent and the \textit{Miranda} right to counsel”). \textit{See also infra nn. ____-____} (discussing Thompkins).


\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Miranda}, at 475-77. \textit{Cf.} \textit{Fare v. Michael C}, 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (the requirements of \textit{Miranda} applies the same to juveniles as adults).


Court has said that the question of whether *Miranda* rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived “must be determined ‘on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’”\(^{60}\)

The closest the Court has come to setting forth a comprehensive list of factors to be considered in evaluating a *Miranda* waiver was in *Fare v. Michael C.*\(^{61}\) In *Fare*, the Court considered a confession by a juvenile. In assessing whether a *Miranda* waiver by the juvenile was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, the Court explained:

> [The] totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. . . The totality approach permits – indeed it mandates – inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.\(^{62}\)

The *Fare* Court did not, however, suggest that the list provided was exhaustive in any sense.\(^{63}\)

Many of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have established a more comprehensive set of factors to consider is assessing the whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has suggested that trial courts to consider, among other factors, the defendant's background, his mental and physical condition, and the duration and conditions of

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\(^{60}\) *Butler*, 441 U.S. at 374-75 (*quoting* *Zerbst*, 304 U.S. at 464);


\(^{62}\) 442 U.S. at 725.

\(^{63}\) In contrast, compare the detailed direction provided by the Supreme Court in reviewing whether consents to searches are voluntary in *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In that case, the Supreme Court relied upon cases assessing the voluntary nature of confessions, and held that the voluntary nature of a consent to a search must be assessed in “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.” 412 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has explained that examination of the totality of circumstances includes, but is not limited to, such considerations as the “background, experience, and conduct” of the defendant. The Tenth Circuit has identified five factors that should be considered to determine whether a Miranda waiver was voluntary:

1. the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; 
2. the length of [any] detention; 
3. the length and nature of the questioning; 
4. whether the defendant was advised of [his or] her constitutional rights; and 
5. whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment.

The Third Circuit has provided several factors to guide this analysis: the defendant's age, education, intelligence, occupation, advice of rights administered, length of detention, length of questioning, physical or mental punishment or exhaustion.

II. THE COURT’S RECENT MIRANDA CASES: MONTEJO, POWELL, SHATZER AND THOMPKINS

Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the Supreme Court decide four cases dealing with Miranda related issues. In deciding these four cases, the Court began a process of limiting Miranda and focusing more responsibility of the subjective knowledge of suspects.

A. MONTEJO

The Supreme Court decided Montejo v. Louisiana in May 2009. In Montejo the defendant was a 23 years old at who had not graduated from high school; he had an “extensive”

64 U.S. v. Steele, 82 Fed.Appx. 172 (7th Cir. 2003)
65 United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 418 (8th Cir.1993).
66 United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir.1997)). These factors are not exclusive. The Tenth Circuit has also instructed trial courts to consider whether “the government obtained the statements by physical or psychological coercion such that the defendant's will was overborne.” United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir.1999)).
juvenile record, and had been incarcerated for six years in Florida.\textsuperscript{68} The victim was found by his wife dead in his home. He had suffered two gunshots. The Defendant became a suspect because several neighbors noticed his blue van, which had a “distinctive chrome cattle bar,” near the victim’s home at the time of the murder.\textsuperscript{69} The police later determined that the suspect had an accomplice who was a disgruntled former employee; the former employee was familiar with the victim’s routine and would have been aware that he was likely to possess a large amount of cash on the day of the murder.

The Defendant was taken into custody and repeatedly provided with his \textit{Miranda} warnings, signed written waivers, and consented to speak to the police detectives.\textsuperscript{70} Over the course of four hours of interviews, the defendant admitted that he had shot the victim during an attempted burglary. The defendant initially claimed that his only involvement was in driving a co-defendant to the victim’s home and leaving him there without knowing that the co-defendant was going to rob and kill the victim.

Montejo then proceeded to tell other versions of his story before asking to speak with an attorney. The detectives ceased the interview, then, at the request of the defendant, re-started the interview. The defendant told more different versions of the story, finally admitting that he had believed that the house was unlocked, contained a lot of money, and would be unoccupied. The defendant claimed that he found a gun inside the house and picked it up to scare anyone away who might come home. When the victim returned home, the defendant hit him over the head with the gun, fired a warning shot, and then, after a struggle, shot him in the head. The defendant then fled in the victim’s vehicle, threw the gun into a lake, gave some money to his co-

\textsuperscript{69} Slip Op. at 3. The police later discovered the defendant’s DNA beneath the victim’s fingernails. Slip Op. at 4.
\textsuperscript{70} The defendant conceded that he received appropriate \textit{Miranda} warnings. Def. Br. at 2.
defendants, and used the rest of the money to pay bills.\footnote{La Opinion at } This validity of this first statement was not an issue before the Supreme Court.\footnote{LA. Brief at 3}

Four days after Montejo was detained and first interrogated the officers brought the defendant Montejo before a judge for a mandatory initial hearing.\footnote{See Article 230.1, Section A of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure} The hearing was not transcribed, but the minute entry indicates that the defendant was denied bail and had counsel appointed through the Office of the Indigent Defender.\footnote{See Def. Br. at 7; State Br. at 4.} After the hearing, the detectives again approached Montejo. They requested that he assist them in searching for the gun by accompanying them to the area where he had already told them he threw the gun into the lake. According to the detectives, Montejo denied that he had obtained counsel.\footnote{La Brief at 4-5.} Montejo subsequently testified at the trial that he told the detectives, “Yeah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me.”\footnote{Def Br. at 8.}

Montejo was again provided with his Miranda rights and again agreed to waive the rights. He accompanied the detectives to the lake, although the gun was never found.\footnote{See La. Opinion at n. 44.} He also wrote a letter to the widow of the victim. In the letter, Montejo sought to minimize his role in the murder, and expressed some remorse.\footnote{The letter is reprinted in the Opinion by the Louisiana Supreme Court. It reads: This two-page letter reads as follows (with spelling and punctuation unaltered but capitalization normalized for legibility): Ms. Ferrari, This is very hard to put in the right words but I will try hard. My soul is feeling you very much. If I could rwind time I wish that bullet would of hit me. Please finish reading. I

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\footnote{La Opinion at }\footnote{LA. Brief at 3}\footnote{See Article 230.1, Section A of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure}\footnote{See Def. Br. at 7; State Br. at 4.}\footnote{La Brief at 4-5.}\footnote{Def Br. at 8.}\footnote{See La. Opinion at n. 44.}\footnote{The letter is reprinted in the Opinion by the Louisiana Supreme Court. It reads: 49This two-page letter reads as follows (with spelling and punctuation unaltered but capitalization normalized for legibility): Ms. Ferrari, This is very hard to put in the right words but I will try hard. My soul is feeling you very much. If I could rwind time I wish that bullet would of hit me. Please finish reading. I}
The issue before the Court was whether to overrule *Michigan v. Jackson.* The Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the right to counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and that interrogations was one of those critical stages.

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really want you to know I had no intention on his death and I am in a log of true pain I’m so sorry I can picture your heart dropping at sight it is eating me up inside so bad. I try to talk to Loue every day to say I’m sorry and wish I could let you feel my emotion to know truely how sorry and how bad this is tearing me up. I promise you I didn’t cold blood kill Mr. Loue if I could change places I would be dead. Please be strong only God really knows why this happen you a beautiful woman and I’m huting more than you would really expect to know I caused that I did crimes before but I’m really not as harmful as what happen please forgive me Ms. Ferrari I pray for you to be strong and get through I will prey every day I’m accepting God for once in my life and begging for forgiveness I’m so sorry please forgive me I was going for a simple burgulary in and out that someone put me on and instead I found the gun so I thought if someone does come in I can scare with the gun and run but he wasn’t scared I swear I tried to just run Ms. Fearri but he wouldn’t let me I even fired a warning which skint him on the side but he still kept coming strong I couldn’t see then the shot and he flew back I ran with no ride I grabed his keys I almost shot myself the gun was cocked back again and I didn’t know how thats how scared I was so I shot into the couch I know you needed to know this Ms. Ferri and may God be with you and make you strong because hes killing me inside.

Opinion at n. 49 (reprinted verbatim).

79, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986),

80 The majority and the dissent disagree about the actual holding of *Jackson.* The majority claims that *Jackson* held that law enforcement officers could not initiate an interrogation of a defendant “once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.” 129 S.Ct. at 2082.. The dissent claims that *Jackson* stood for the proposition that law enforcement officers could not initiate an interrogation once an attorney-client relationship had been established. 129 S.Ct. at 2095 ((Stevens, J., dissenting).

81 129 S.Ct. at 2085. The Court has not provided a definitive list of ‘critical stages.’ " But some cases have held certain stages to be critical. See e.g. *Iowa v. Tovar,* 541 U.S. 77, 81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) (entry of a guilty plea); *Gardner v. Florida,* 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (sentencing); *United States v. Wade,* 388 U.S. 218, 236-37, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (post-indictment lineup)
The Montejo Court did not re-examine whether the right to have counsel present at an interrogation may be waived, so long as the waiver is “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” The Court explained that “when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick . . . ” The Court refused to apply a prophylactic rule prohibiting any contact with represented defendants, similar to the rule established in Edwards v. Arizona. In Edwards, the Court had held that once a suspect requests the presence of counsel, no further interrogation may be initiated by the officers. This decision was based on the premise that such a rule was necessary “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” In Montejo, the Court placed a greater obligation on the defendant or suspect to speak up. The Court said:

a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of “a suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer's presence” before his arraignment, it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment . . . Accordingly, the Court in Montejo was willing to abandon the Jackson rule because the existing safeguards of the Miranda regime are sufficient to guarantee that any waiver is truly voluntary.

83 129 S.Ct. at 2085.
85 451 U.S. at 484-85.
86 129 S.Ct. at 2086, citing Harvey at 350.
87 129 S.Ct. at 2090 (citations omitted)
88 A number of commentators have criticized the approach taken by the Montejo Court. The staff of the University of Kansas Law Review noted:
B. **POWELL**

In *Florida v. Powell*, the Court considered the use of a *Miranda* form by the Tampa Police Department that did not explicitly advise the suspect that he could have a lawyer present during questioning.\(^89\) The Defendant in *Powell* was facing possible charges of being a convicted felon in possession of a gun.\(^90\) He had ten prior felony convictions.\(^91\)

The Defendant was taken into custody after the police arrested him at his girlfriend’s apartment in connection with a robbery investigation.\(^92\) The police conducted a search of the apartment and discovered a gun underneath the bed in the room that the defendant appeared to have been in on their arrival.\(^93\) Prior to his interview with the Tampa Police, the defendant was shown the standard waiver form used by the police.\(^94\) He indicated that he understood his rights and signed the waiver form.\(^95\) At trial, as the State pointed out in its brief, the Defendant acknowledged that he had “waived the right to have an attorney present during . . .

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\(^{89}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1200.
\(^{91}\) Florida Br. at 4.
\(^{92}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1200. *See also* Def. Br. at 4.
\(^{93}\) Def. Br. at 4.
\(^{94}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1200. The form states: “You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”
\(^{95}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1200.
The defendant argued that the warnings used by the Tampa Police were insufficient because they did not inform him that he could have an attorney present during questioning. The warning form did not state that the suspect had the rights to have counsel present during questioning. Instead, the form stated that the suspect could “talk to” and attorney “before answering any of our questions.” This argument was based on a reading of the warnings that suggested the while suspect could consult with an attorney, the suspect did not have a right to have the attorney present during questioning.

The Court rejected this argument. The Court held that the warnings provided to the defendant were sufficient to convey to the defendant that he could have an attorney present. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly relied upon the common sense of the defendant.

The Court said:

A reasonable suspect in a custodial setting who has just been read his rights, we believe, would not come to the counterintuitive conclusion that he is obligated, or allowed, to hop in and out of the holding area to seek his attorney's advice. Instead, the suspect would likely assume that he must stay put in the interrogation room and that his lawyer would be there with him the entire time.

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96 Florida Br. at 4.
97 130 S.Ct. at 1200.
98 See Def. Br. at 5.
99 The Florida Supreme Court adopted this reasoning. See ___ (“The ‘before questioning’ warning suggests to a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes that he or she can only consult with an attorney before questioning; there is nothing in that statement that suggests the attorney can be present during the actual questioning.”).
100 The Court cited to two cases where warnings, read in context, adequately conveyed to the suspect his right to have counsel present during interrogations. 130 S.Ct. at 1204-5, citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
101 130 S.Ct. at 1205.
The Court also rejected the idea that the police would intentionally use an inadequate form in the hopes of tricking suspects into waiving their *Miranda* rights.\(^{102}\) Instead, the Court accepted the position of the government, especially the Solicitor General as *amicus curiae*, that law enforcement would prefer to eliminate the risks of suppression and the costs of litigation by providing adequate warnings.\(^{103}\)

C. **Shatzer**

In *Maryland v. Shatzer* the Supreme Court considered the implications of a break in custody on the *Edwards* rule. The Defendant was a suspect in the alleged sexual abuse of his three year old son.\(^{104}\) A police detective assigned to the Child Advocacy Center had received a report from a social worker that the suspect had received oral sex from the child.\(^{105}\) The detective went to a state prison to interview the suspect, who at the time was serving a sentence for an unrelated sexual offense. The detective provided the defendant with his *Miranda* warnings and obtained a written waiver. The Defendant – after some initial confusion about the allegations being discussed – indicated that he would not talk without an attorney present.\(^{106}\) The detective then terminated the interview.\(^{107}\)

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\(^{102}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1205-6. Justice Sotomoyer, at oral argument, raised the question of whether the police may have intentionally used improper warnings. She asked counsel for the government: “Why wouldn't the intent of the entity at issue be placed in question? Meaning, you could have -- the police here could have chosen to be explicit, but instead they chose be -- to obfuscate a little bit and be less explicit. Shouldn't we assume that that is an intent to deceive or perhaps to confuse?” Oral arg. at ___.

\(^{103}\) 130 S.Ct at 1205-6.

\(^{104}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1217.

\(^{105}\) The child said that the defendant “pulled his pants down, exposed his penis, apparently put milk on his penis, and told [the child] to lick his worm . . .” Petitioner’s Br. at 3. *See also* Respondent’s Brief at 1.

\(^{106}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1217. The Detective wrote in his report: “When I attempted to again initiate the interview, he [the defendant] told me that he would not talk without an attorney present.” Respondent’s Br. at 1.

\(^{107}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1217.
Approximately two and one-half years later, the police re-opened the investigation.\textsuperscript{108} The Defendant remained incarcerated on the unrelated offense.\textsuperscript{109} The detective – who had not worked on the original investigation provided the defendant with his \textit{Miranda} warnings and obtained a written waiver.\textsuperscript{110} The Defendant denied any physical contact but agreed to take a polygraph examination. Prior to the polygraph examination five days later, the defendant admitted to masturbating in front of the child and then said, “I didn’t force him. I didn’t force him.”\textsuperscript{111}

The Defendant was charged with the sexual abuse of his son.\textsuperscript{112} He filed a motion to suppress his statements, as having been made in violation of \textit{Edwards}. The trial court denied the motions. The defendant was subsequently convicted of sexual child abuse and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, consecutive to the sentence he was serving, with all but five years suspended.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{108} According the brief from the State of Maryland, the investigation was reopened because the police had received “additional, more specific allegations ‘because the child was more mature, able to articulate what had happened to him several years before.’” Petitioner’s Br. at 4, \textit{citing} Testimony from Suppression Hearing contained in Joint Appendix.

\textsuperscript{109} 130 S.Ct. at 1217-18.

\textsuperscript{110} 130 S.Ct. at 1218.

\textsuperscript{111} 130 S.Ct. at 1218. There is some confusion about the exact timing of the inculpatory statements about masturbating in front of the child. The Supreme Court reports that the statements were made during the initial interview with the new detective. \textit{Id.} This same report of the facts is contained in the opinion from the Maryland Court of Appeals, and appears to be consistent with an agreed statement of facts. Slip Op. at 3-4 and n. 3. However, the brief from the state indicates that this admission occurred during the pre-polygraph interview. Petitioner’s Br. at 5. The Defendant’s brief is silent on this factual issue.

\textsuperscript{112} 130 S.Ct. at 1218.

\textsuperscript{113} 130 S.Ct. at 1218; Appeals Ct. Slip Op. at 5.. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted on an agreed statement of facts consisting of a summary of the victim’s statement and the defendant’s admissions.
The Court, in analyzing the defendant’s claim under *Edwards*, emphasized that the *Edwards* Rule “is not a constitutional mandate, but [a] judicially prescribed prophylaxis.” The court then described what it referred to as the “paradigm *Edwards* case:”

That is a case in which the suspect has been arrested for a particular crime and is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody while that crime is being actively investigated. After the initial interview, and up to and including the second one, he remains cut off from his normal life and companions, “thrust into” and isolated in an “unfamiliar,” “police dominated atmosphere,” where his captors “appear to control [his] fate.”

The Court then explained that, in contrast to the paradigm *Edwards* case, if a suspect is “returned to his normal life,” then any “change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel” is not likely to have been coerced. For this reason, the Court rejected the idea that the *Edwards* rule amounted to an “eternal” prohibition against police initiated interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of counsel. Instead, the Court held that the police may re-approach a suspect who had requested counsel after the “termination” of custody and “any of its lingering effects.”

The *Shatzer* Court proceeded to determine the appropriate length of time of the break in custody before police may re-approach a suspect who had requested counsel. The Court set the time limit at 14 days. The Court explained that 14 days is “plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual

114 130 S.Ct. at 1220, *citing, inter alia, Montejo*, 129 S.Ct. at 2085-86.
115 130 S.Ct. at 1220 (citations omitted).
116 130 S.Ct. at 1221. The Court was also concerned that extending *Edwards* would increase the costs to society by excluding voluntary confessions from trial while minimally deterring police misconduct. *Id.* at 1221-22.
117 130 S.Ct at 1222.
118 130 S.Ct. at 1223.
coercive effects of his prior custody.”

In Shatzer’s case, even though he was incarcerated, because he was returned to his “accustomed surroundings,” and because his detention in prison was unrelated to his willingness to cooperate in the investigation,” the two and one-half year break between interrogations was sufficient to permit a court to conclude that his waiver of his Miranda rights during the second interrogation was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

D. **BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS**

In *Berghuis v. Thompkins*, the Court considered the manner in which a suspect must invoke, or waive, Miranda rights. Thompkins, was a suspect in a shooting outside a mall in January 2000. The victims of the shooting were involved in a dispute with the defendant and several other men while driving through a mall parking lot in Michigan. The defendant and the other men proceeded to follow the victims, with the defendant sitting in the passenger seat of his van. The van pulled up alongside the victims. Thompkins said, “What you say, Big Dog” and then fired several shots into the victims car, killing one person and wounding another.

The surviving victim identified the defendant from a photograph taken by a security camera. The defendant was arrested a year later in Ohio. Detectives from Michigan traveled to Ohio to interview the defendant. The detectives read the defendant a form advising him of his Miranda rights. The defendant orally indicated that he understood his rights, but refused to sign

119 130 S.Ct. at 1223. The Court did not provide any rationale for choosing 14 days.

120 130 S.Ct. at 1227. The Court maintained a presumption that waivers after a suspect invokes the right to counsel are involuntary. 130 S.Ct. at 1223 n. 7; 130 S. Ct. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).

121 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010). The case was brought as a *habeas* petition in Federal District Court in Michigan.

122 130 S.Ct at 2256.

123 Court of Appeals

124 Court of Appeals

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the form. The detective, at a suppression hearing, described the interview as “very, very one-sided,” and as “nearly a monologue,” The defendant mostly “remained silent,” but “shared very limited verbal responses . . .” and “talk[ed] . . . very sporadically.”\textsuperscript{125} Mostly the defendant said, “I don’t know,” or “yeah.”\textsuperscript{126} The detective said that the defendant occasionally gave both non-verbal responses to questions, such as making eye contact, looking up, or nodding his head.\textsuperscript{127}

The interview lasted approximately two hours and forty-five minutes. At the end, the detective asked the defendant whether he “believed in God.” The detective testified that the about the defendant’s response as follows:

I finally looked at him, and I asked him, tried to take a different tact, what I call a spiritual tact, whether or not he believed in God. He made eye-contact with me for one of the few times that he did for the interview. I saw his eyes well up with tears. He answered me orally and said, “Yes.” I asked if he had prayed to God? And he said “Yes.” And I asked him if he had asked God to forgive him for—I believe the words were, and I quoted them in my report verbatim “shooting that boy down.” And he answered, “Yes.”\textsuperscript{128}

The defendant was, on the basis of this inculpatory statement and other evidence, convicted of murder.

The Supreme Court held that a suspect must invoke the right to remain silent (and the right to counsel) unambiguously.\textsuperscript{129} The Court clarified that, while a waiver of \textit{Miranda} rights cannot be inferred from silence, a waiver can be established without a “formal or express statement.”\textsuperscript{130} Instead, an “implicit waiver” of \textit{Miranda} rights can be inferred after suspects have

\textsuperscript{125} Court of Appeals
\textsuperscript{126} Court of Appeals
\textsuperscript{127} Court of Appeals
\textsuperscript{128} 130 S.Ct. at 2257; Court of Appeals; Pet. Br. at 5-6/
\textsuperscript{129} 130 S.Ct. at 2260.
\textsuperscript{130} 130 S.Ct at 2261.
been informed of their rights from silence combined with a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”\textsuperscript{131} The Court explained:

Where the prosecution shows that a \textit{Miranda} warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, and accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. . . .

As a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.\textsuperscript{132}

In other words, the Court explained, “a suspect who has received and understood the \textit{Miranda} warnings, and has not invoked his \textit{Miranda} rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement . . . ”\textsuperscript{133}

In \textit{Thompkins}, thus, the Court was able to infer a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of \textit{Miranda} rights by the defendant. There was little dispute that the defendant received his \textit{Miranda} warnings and no evidence of coercion. A waiver was inferred from the mere act of the defendant providing a statement under these circumstances. The Court said, “If [the defendant] wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing . . . or he could have unambiguously invoked his \textit{Miranda} rights and ended the interrogation.”\textsuperscript{134} In contrast, ambiguity would harm law enforcement efforts, as “police would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused’s unclear intent. and face the consequence of suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’”\textsuperscript{135}


\textsuperscript{132} 130 S.Ct. at 2261-62.

\textsuperscript{133} 130 S.Ct. at 2264.

\textsuperscript{134} 130 S.Ct. at 2263. Although Miranda stated that the government has a " 'heavy burden' to show waiver" the \textit{Thompkins} Court discounted this standard, observing that "this 'heavy burden' is not more than the burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence." 130 S.Ct. at 2261.

The dissent argued that “inculpatory statements by themselves are [not] sufficient” to establish a waiver. 130 S.Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

III. COMMON THEMES IN RECENT SUPREME COURT MIRANDA CASES

Some commentators have suggested that the recent Miranda cases reflect a continued effort by conservative or prosecution oriented Justices to slowly peel back Miranda protections. In a web posting, for example, Professor Sherrilyn Ifill of the University of Maryland suggested in a web posting shortly after the Thompkins decision that the conservative majority’s approach to Miranda is the result of a disdain for the initial decision, coupled with a lack of real-world and defense counsel experience on the Court.136 Professor Patrick Noonan has posted an article in response to Thompkins in particular, titled The Death of Miranda.137 In this article, he suggests that the Court’s decisions “Court’s decision . . . disrupt[] the purpose and meaning of Miranda. That is, the decision takes the power to exert control over the course of the interrogation from the defendant and places it back into the hands of the interrogator.”138

The limiting of Miranda was also noted in the media. Time Magazine published an article entitled, “Has the Supreme Court Decimated Miranda?”139 After reviewing the Thompkins decision, the magazine wrote:

For years, conservatives continued to attack the Miranda decision, holding out hope that it would be reversed. In 2000, it seemed like it might finally happen — the court had a case that posed a direct challenge to Miranda, and it had a five-member conservative majority. But in the end, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, leader of the conservative bloc, wrote an opinion for a 7-2 majority reaffirming Miranda. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice," he wrote, "to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."

138 Id. (internal citations omitted)
Instead of overruling Miranda, the conservative Justices have now done something they are doing to many landmark progressive decisions — quietly chipping away to the point that they have little power left.\footnote{Adam Cohen, “Has the Supreme Court Decimated Miranda?” Time June 2, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1993580,00.html (visited October 15, 2010).}


**A. CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND**

A close reading of the recent opinions, however, suggests that there may be a more subtle theme running through the cases than a straight forward attack on *Miranda*. In all four recent *Miranda* cases, the court chose to accept cases with defendants who had significant experience with the criminal justice system. The defendants in these cases, it can be inferred, were familiar with the *Miranda* warnings from having received them in prior contact with law enforcement. In addition, it can be inferred that the defendants were aware that the police would honor the *Miranda* warnings. Finally, it could be inferred that the defendants were familiar with police tactics and were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation of custodial interrogation. This was raised, sometimes implicitly in the four cases:

*Montejo.* The Court’s decision in *Montejo* does not explicitly mention the defendant’s background and experience with the criminal justice system. However, this appears to be an unstated factor in the decision. At oral argument, counsel for the State of Louisiana noted that
the defendant had waived his *Miranda* rights on seven prior occasions.\(^{143}\) The Court’s decision extensively discusses the potential badgering by the police during custodial interrogations that *Jackson* was designed to prevent. However, this type of badgering is likely to have a greater effect on a criminal defendant who is inexperienced with police tactics. Some observers have noted that by describing the purpose of *Jackson* to the prevention of police badgering of suspects, the court gave less weight to the interest of protecting the relationship “between the uninformed suspect and his hopefully knowledgeable counsel.”\(^{144}\) The contrast to this is that defendants with experience with and knowledge about the criminal justice system are less likely to be impacted. In contrast, a defendant with multiple prior arrests is more likely to see badgering as a tactic, only.

This contrast clear in the *Montejo* decision. In deciding to permit officers to approach represented defendants, the *Montejo* Court implicitly took into account the background and experience of the defendant. The result of the *Montejo* decision is most likely to be felt by defendants who, some have noted, are “mentally retarded, mentally ill, and juveniles.”\(^{145}\) For example, Geoffrey Sweeney notes that the “procedural consequences of the *Montejo* decision place vulnerable defendants at peril.”\(^{146}\) Yet the Court seems to be making law based on the assumption that most defendants are like the defendant in *Montejo*. The Court said, “No reason exists to assume *that a defendant like Montejo*, who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable to

\(^{143}\) Oral Argument at 29. *But see* Oral Argument at 39 (Justice Kennedy: “He’s not versed in the law, he’s in this stressful situation.”)


\(^{145}\) Sweeney, 55 Loy. L. Rev. at 646.

\(^{146}\) *Id.*
speaking with the police without having counsel present. And no reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.”\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Powell.} In \textit{Powell}, the Court was presented with a suspect who had ten prior felony convictions. The subjective knowledge of a defendant seems to also be behind this decision, even if not stated explicitly. During oral argument, Justice Scalia pointedly questioned the defendant’s attorney about whether his client actually was confused by the warning provided. He asked:

This is angels dancing on the head of a pin. You want us to believe that your client, who decided to talk, even though he was told he could consult an attorney before any question was asked, and he could consult an attorney at any time during the interview, and he went ahead and -- and confessed -- you are saying, oh, if he had only known. Oh, if I knew that I could have an attorney present during the interview, well, that would have been a different kettle of fish and I would never have confessed. I mean, doesn't that seem to you quite fantastic?\textsuperscript{148}

The record before the Court, in fact, suggested that the defendant was well aware of his rights when he executed the improper waiver.

In a footnote, the Court indicated that the defendant had actual knowledge that he could have an attorney present during questioning.\textsuperscript{149} However, the Court said that this fact “does not bear on our conclusion.”\textsuperscript{150} Thus, while the Court was not backing away from the need for adequate warnings, the Court refused to allow possible ambiguity to trump actual knowledge.

\textit{Shatzer.} In \textit{Shatzer}, the prior experience of the defendant with interrogations was a significant factor in finding that the \textit{Edwards} prohibition on against police initiated interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of counsel could be limited to fourteen days.

\textsuperscript{147} 129 S.Ct. at 2086-87 (emphasis omitted in original and supplied).
\textsuperscript{148} Oral arg. at 39-40.
\textsuperscript{149} 130 S.Ct. at 1205 n. 7
\textsuperscript{150} 130 S.Ct. at 1205 n. 7. \textit{See also} 130 S.Ct. at 1212 n. 10 (Stevens, J. dissenting (noting that “the testimony is irrelevant” because “circumstantial evidence” of knowledge cannot replace the need to adequate warnings.”)}
Justice Ginsburg, during oral arguments, noted that this past experience was relevant to whether a suspect would understand that he could exercise his right to counsel. She asked counsel for the defendant:

Why wouldn’t he think, I invoked my right to remain silent without a lawyer two years and seven months ago, I will do it again; they will have to stop questioning? Why wouldn’t that be the most likely mindset of the defendant? He knew that it worked the first time.\(^{151}\)

The *Shatzer* Court noted that a defendant “knows from his prior experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt, and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely.”\(^{152}\) The Court suggested that it is possible a suspect could determine, based on his experiences “and further deliberation in a familiar setting . . . that cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.”\(^{153}\) Moreover, in weighing the costs and benefits of extending the *Edwards* rule, the court considered the effects of this extension “[i]n a country that harbors a large number of repeat offenders.”\(^{154}\) To support this observation, the Court noted that, in a recent Department of Justice study, 67.5% of released prisoners were re-arrested within three years.\(^{155}\)

*Thompkins*. In *Thompkins*, the precise criminal record of the defendant was not specified in either the Supreme Court or the state court decisions. However, the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction, as in addition to the murder conviction, he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun.\(^{156}\) He also appeared to be experienced with and unintimidated by

\(^{151}\) Oral argument at 54-55.
\(^{152}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1221.
\(^{153}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1221.
\(^{154}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1222.
\(^{155}\) 130 S.Ct. at 1222 n. 6.
the legal system; when he was arrested, he initially fled from the police, then provided a false name and false identification.\textsuperscript{157}

The unambiguous statement requirement in \textit{Thompkins} is a shift of responsibility from law enforcement to the suspect. The Court concluded that the statement given by the defendant was the result of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver based on a lack of evidence of failure of the police to provide a \textit{Miranda} warning, explicit invocation of \textit{Miranda} rights, or coercion. The Court states its conclusion in the negative:

\begin{quote}
The record in this case shows that [the defendant] waived his right to remain silent. There is \textit{no basis to conclude} that he did not understand his rights, and on these facts it follows that he chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he did speak.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

Later in the opinion, the Court provided a list of reasons why a suspect might rationally decide to waive their \textit{Miranda} rights and speak to the police. The Court suggested that a suspect may gain “additional information” to aid in the decision.\textsuperscript{159} The Court continued:

\begin{quote}
When the suspect knows that \textit{Miranda} rights can be invoked at any time, he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her immediate and long-term interests. Cooperation with the police may result in more favorable treatment for the suspect, the apprehension of accomplices, the prevention of continuing injury and fear, beginning steps towards relief or solace for the victims; and the beginning of the suspect’s own return to the law and social order it seeks to protect.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{157} Court of Appeals, Pet. Br. at 11. \\
\textsuperscript{158} 130 S.Ct at 2262. Justice Scalia, during oral argument, put it more plainly:  
I don't understand how this person could just sit there for 2 hours and didn't want to be interrogated and doesn't say: You know, I don't want to answer your questions. He just sits there and some questions he doesn't answer. And he does make a few comments, anyway. . . . Why shouldn't we have a rule which simply says if you don't want to be interrogated, all you have to say is "I don't want to answer your questions?  
Oral arg. at ___.  \\
\textsuperscript{159} 130 S.Ct at 2264.  \\
\textsuperscript{160} 130 S.Ct at 2264.
\end{flushright}
The *Thompkins* Court thus signaled that an implied waiver of *Miranda* rights is sufficient. In other words, the law does not requires an express waiver of *Miranda* rights. The result is that criminal defendants are required to take the initiative to invoke, expressly and unambiguously, their *Miranda* rights following an advisement to them of those rights.

**B. CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND BY STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS**

The consideration of the criminal history and background of defendants in *Miranda* cases is not new or unique. The U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly considered this factor in determining whether a waiver was voluntary. However, it is implicit in another decision. In *Fare*, the Supreme Court considered an argument by a juvenile that he had been unable to understand his rights.\(^{161}\) The Court, in rejecting this argument, noted that the juvenile had “considerable experience with the police” and that he had “a record of several arrests,” had served time in a “youth camp,” and was on probation.\(^{162}\)

More explicit examples are found in the lower courts. One example is the recent Sixth Circuit decision in *Simpson v. Jackson*.\(^{163}\) In *Simpson*, the Defendant, was under investigation for aiding and abetting an arson – through the use of a molotov cocktail -- which led to the death of a child and injuries to a number of other persons. The Defendant challenged the use of four statements he gave to the police. One of the statements was made to a Columbus Police Department homicide detective and a Federal Special Agent while the defendant was in prison

\(^{161}\) See infra nn ___-___.

\(^{162}\) 442 U.S. at 726.

\(^{163}\) *Simpson v. Jackson*, ___ F.3d ___, No. 08-3224 (6th Cir. July 13, 2010). The case came before the Federal court on a *habeas* review of a state court conviction.
on an unrelated charge.\textsuperscript{164} The interview was held in a conference room in the warden's office after the defendant was pulled from general population.

After a second statement at the prison (this time, in the infirmary), the law enforcement officers arranged the release of the defendant on probation so that he would cooperate with the investigation. However, the defendant failed to cooperate and to abide by the terms of his probation. He was arrested and interrogated at police headquarters. Prior to the interview, the Defendant was given his \textit{Miranda} rights. He subsequently admitted his involvement in starting the fire.

When the defendant was asked whether he was willing to speak with the officers after receiving his \textit{Miranda} rights, he responded:

(1) “mmm-mmmm,” clearly in a negative way; (2) a sideways shake of his hand and a slight shake of his head; (3) mumbling something and then saying “nah” or “naw”; and (4) then saying “I messed up last time I did that.” The officer then replied, “So you don't want to talk to us? You do or you don't want to talk to us?” [the defendant] responded with more negative body language and said, “I mean, it can't help.” Following four to five seconds of silence, the officer said, “Well that's up to you, whether you want to talk to us or not, we're not going to twist your arm or anything like that.” [the defendant] immediately responded, “what y'all wanna talk about?” and the officer stated, “just basically what we're talking about now.”

The Defendant then started to question the officer about the details of his current arrest; the officer did not ask any questions. Another officer then asked the defendant, “so do you want to talk to us about any of this or not?” The Defendant mumbled an intelligible response and was handed a written \textit{Miranda} waiver form. The Defendant said, “I mean, this right here, it really don't make no difference, you know what I'm saying, sign it or not.”

The Defendant in \textit{Simpson} challenged the voluntariness of his waiver, arguing that the officers “used a combination of threats and promises, which had the cumulative effect of

\textsuperscript{164} 3d. at ___
overbearing his will.” The court rejected this argument. The court considered the fact that the defendant was “familiar with the officers.” The court noted that “it is clear that [the defendant] had extensive experience with the criminal justice system.” Accordingly, “the experience of being questioned by the police was not new or novel to him.”

In another case, the court considered the defendant’s criminal history as a factor in determining whether a lengthy interrogation rendered a waiver of *Miranda* rights involuntary. In *Williams v. Norris*, the defendant was a suspect in the disappearance of a woman in Little Rock. He was arrested on an outstanding warrant, waived his *Miranda* rights, and during a thirteen hour interview confessed to kidnapping the woman. The Defendant argued that his waiver of his *Miranda* rights was involuntary because, during the “marathon interrogation” in a “cramped room” he was subjected to coercive tactics, including appeals to God and sympathy for the victim’s family. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the defendant was “relatively well educated and experienced with the criminal justice system.”

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165 See also *United States v Marda*, No. 04-10278-RGS, 2008 WL 2856783 (D.Mass. July 21, 2008.) (noting that defendant “is an experienced defendant who had been previously arrested on at least two occasions for possession of weapons and drugs. On cross-examination,[the defendant] acknowledged his prior familiarity with the *Miranda* warnings.”);

166 576 F.3d 850 (8th Circuit 2009).

167 576 F.3d at 854. The victim’s body was found later. Based on forensic evidence, the defendant was convicted of her rape and murder.

168 576 F.3d at 868. The *Williams* court suggests, without citation, that appeals to God may be coercive. The author has not found an example in Federal Courts where a confession has been suppressed as coercive for this reason. Cf. *Davis v. State of North Carolina*, 339 F.2d 770, 775-76 (4th Cir. 1964) (prayer by officer seeking God’s blessing not coercive); *Skaggs v. Parker*, 27 F.Supp.2d 952, 974 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding “insufficient evidence” that religious discussion was coercive). Supreme Court precedents are not to the contrary. See *Colorado v. Connelly*, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed. 473 (1986) (*Miranda* waiver not involuntary where psychiatrist testified that defendant believed God had told him to confess); *Brewer v. Williams*, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct 1232 (1977) (“Christian burial” speech violated right to counsel, not voluntary nature of confession). See also infra n. ____ (Berghuis appeal to God)

169 576 F.3d at 869. See also *Treesh v. Bagley*, No. 07-3524, 2010 WL 2771869 (6th Cir 2010) (“In further support of the conclusion that [the defendant] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, . . . [he] testified that he was familiar with the criminal justice system.”); *United States v. Doe*, 226 F.3d
State courts interpreting the voluntariness of a confession have been more explicit than Federal Courts in including criminal background among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness. The Minnesota Supreme Court has been explicit in considering the importance of a suspect’s familiarity with the criminal justice system. The court has stated, “In assessing voluntariness, this court has focused heavily on both a defendant's education and his familiarity with the criminal justice system. We have found significant in previous cases that the defendant had been read his Miranda rights before the investigation at issue.”\textsuperscript{170} The Colorado Supreme Court has also provided an explicit statement that “the background and experience of the defendant in connection with the criminal justice system” is a factor to be considered in determining whether a waiver is voluntary.\textsuperscript{171} And the Iowa Supreme Court has held that a court should rely upon a wide range of factors in determining whether a defendant's waiver of rights was voluntary, including “a defendant's prior experience in the criminal justice system.”\textsuperscript{172}

Even in situations where defendants have more limited mental capabilities, prior experience with the criminal justice system can be considered a significant factor in finding that defendants voluntarily waived their \textit{Miranda} rights. In, for example, \textit{United States v. Rojas-Tapia},\textsuperscript{173} the defendant was arrested on suspicion of being involved in a plan to hijack a helicopter, and then use the helicopter to stage a prison escape in Puerto Rico. During the booking process, and after receiving his \textit{Miranda} warnings, the defendant stated that he wanted to tell the law enforcement officers about his participation in the hijacking. The officers repeated

672, 680 (6th Cir.2000) (finding that a waiver was valid in part because of the defendant's substantial history with the justice system).

\textsuperscript{170} State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 672 (Minn.,1998.) (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{171} People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo.,1989).

\textsuperscript{172} State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa 1992).

\textsuperscript{173} 446 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006)
the *Miranda* warning, and the defendant proceeded to make a detailed confession. The defendant later sought to suppress the statements on the grounds that a report indicated he had a significantly below average IQ. The court rejected this argument, in part because of the defendant’s extensive criminal history. The court described that defendant as “hardly a neophyte in the criminal justice system,” noting his “extensive prior record.” The court, thus, concluded that “whatever the deficiencies in his intellectual functioning, [the defendant’s] repeated earlier exposure to Miranda warnings made it extremely unlikely that he failed to understand his rights at the time he made these incriminating statements.”

Other courts have relied upon the prior criminal justice system experience of defendants to overcome concerns stemming from below average intelligence. In *United States v. Jones*, the court found that a defendant with only an eighth grade education and “below average intelligence” could voluntarily waive his *Miranda* rights based, in part on his “considerable previous experience with the criminal justice system.” Similarly, in *United States v. Connor*, the court rejected an effort by a defendant with a 71 IQ to have his post-*Miranda* confession found to be involuntary. The court said,

> It should be noted that this particular Defendant has been arrested on a number of occasions. Therefore, the 37-year old Defendant is experienced and familiar with

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174 446 F.3d at 2-3.

175 446 F.3d at 8.

176 446 F.3d at 8, citing *Palmer*, 203 F.3d at 61; *United States v. Glover*, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005); *United States v. Pruden*, 398 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir.2005); *Taylor*, 366 F.3d at 1015; *United States v. Morris*, 247 F.3d 1080, 1090 (10th Cir.2001); *Correll v. Thompson*, 63 F.3d 1279, 1288 (4th Cir.1995).

A similar standard has been applied to juvenile suspects. See *United States v. Kerr*, 120 F.3d 239, 241 (11th Cir. 1997) (in evaluating voluntary nature of statement by juvenile, noting that juvenile “had a substantial history of involvement in the Juvenile Justice System and, in fact, was a runaway from a state facility.”); *In re Richard UU*, 870 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476-77 (N.Y.A.D. 3rd Dept. 2008) (confession by 14 year old who “had prior experience with law enforcement and was aware of the significance of his *Miranda* rights” was voluntary).

177 No. 1:09-cr-00110, 2010 WL 1628049 (N.D.Ohio April 7, 2010).
routine police policy such as being read his *Miranda* rights, being hand-cuffed, and being transported to jail, perhaps for additional questioning.\footnote{No. 8:06-cr-342-T-30TGW, 2007 WL 1428923 (M.D.Fla. May 14, 2007). *But see Commonwealth v. Boyarsky*, 452 Mass. 700, 715, 897 N.E.2d 574 (2008) (claim by defendant that he had mental disorder, combined with previous inexperience with justice system, insufficient to raise doubt about voluntariness of confession).}

And, in *Poyner v. Murray*, the court rejected a claim that a waiver by suspect with an IQ between 79 and 85 was involuntary where the suspect with twelve prior convictions “was no stranger to the criminal justice system.”\footnote{*Poyner v. Murray*, 964 F.2d 1404, 1413-14 (4th Cir. 1992).} The *Poyner* court explained that the suspect’s “background provided him with at least some familiarity with his rights and with the process to which he would be subjected.”\footnote{72 F.2d at 1414. *See also United States v. Robinson*, 404 F.3d 850, 860-61 (4th Cir.2005) (waiver by a defendant with a below average I.Q. valid where the suspect had waived his rights on two prior occasions). *But see Commonwealth v. Boyarsky*, 452 Mass. 700, 715, 897 N.E.2d 574 (2008) (claim by defendant that he had mental disorder, combined with previous inexperience with justice system, insufficient to raise doubt about voluntariness of confession).}

IV. **Implications of Increased Emphasis on the Criminal Records of Defendants in Assessing *Miranda* Waivers.**

The increased consideration of the criminal background of suspects, whether implicit by the Supreme Court or explicit by state and lower Federal courts, in determining whether a *Miranda* waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently has several implications for the future of the *Miranda* doctrine.\footnote{See supra 54-56 and accompanying text.}

In terms of individual cases, as the Court begins to more explicitly take into account the criminal history of suspects, the government will find it easier to make the necessary showing to overcome the presumption against waiver. A suspect who is familiar with the criminal justice system, *Miranda* warnings, and police tactics is, it appears in the view of many courts, more
likely to make an uncoerced choice to waive *Miranda* rights because the suspect is more likely to have the requisite level of comprehension.

In more general terms, I foresee two broader implications from the greater consideration of the criminal background of suspects in evaluating *Miranda* waivers:

*First*, an increase focus on the subjective knowledge of suspects signals a shift away from the Court’s traditional *Miranda* focus on preventing abusive police practices. In the original *Miranda* decision, the Court focused on “interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.”¹⁸² Later, the Court in *Dickerson v. United States* was more explicit in recognizing that “the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements.”¹⁸³ The recent *Miranda* decisions have maintained the views that *Miranda* is aimed at curbing abusive police practices. In *Thompkins*, for example, the Court examined whether there was evidence that the defendant’s statement was coerced.¹⁸⁴ And in *Montejo* and *Shatzer*, the emphasized that the *Edwards* rule was a judicially created rule designed to prevent badgering or coercion by the police.¹⁸⁵

The focus on the criminal background of defendant presents a subtle shift in approach. Instead of relying on a prophylactic rule to prevent abusive police tactics, the Court is starting to focus on whether a particular defendant was coerced by the tactics used by the police. In this manner, the Court is able to maintain the rule that the failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning requires exclusion of any statements

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¹⁸² 384 U.S. at 464-65. See also *Chavez v. Martinez*, 538 U.S. 760, 790, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (*Miranda* was intended to “reduce the risk of a coerced confession”).

¹⁸³ 530 U.S. 428, 435 (200).

¹⁸⁴ 130 S.Ct. at 2263.

¹⁸⁵ *Montejo*, 129 S.Ct. at 2089; *Shatzer*, 130 S.Ct at 1230.
obtained. However, in the absence of a direct failure of the police to provide a necessary *Miranda* warning, the exclusion of statements under the *Miranda* doctrine rule will be required in fewer and fewer cases.

The focus on the criminal background of defendants is significant because a court is less likely to find that suspect with extensive experience with the police and *Miranda* warnings is has made an involuntary after receiving warnings.\(^{186}\) The practical implications of this shift include a willingness to allow greater leeway to police, and greater use of aggressive police tactics when dealing with suspects with criminal experience. In addition, as demonstrated by *Thompkins*, the Court seems more likely to infer a waiver of *Miranda* rights from silence from suspects with criminal experience – or if the rule that a waiver cannot be inferred from silence is maintained, the police will be required to make a lesser showing in order to prove that the almost-silent suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver.

*Second*, while it seems unlikely that *Miranda* will be directly overruled, the recent decisions and an increased focus on the criminal background of suspects suggests that the *Miranda* rules will be subtly abandoned in favor of a more subjective test focusing on whether a statement is the result of coercion. Indeed, some observers have suggested that *Miranda* has been already indirectly overruled. For example, Professor Friedman has posted an article that suggests that *Miranda* has been the subject of “stealth” over-ruling.\(^{187}\) Professor Friedman went further in an article in Slate, suggesting that the Court is intentionally choosing cases with suspects with unsympathetic facts of histories:

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\(^{186}\) See *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 433, n. 20, (1984) (noting that cases “in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare”).

Whittle and chip away at the rule any way he can, all the while denying that the rule itself is in jeopardy. But to do their whittling without getting caught, the Roberts Court has been brilliant at stacking the deck—choosing to hear only Miranda cases in which what the police did is so sympathetic, or what the suspect did so awful, it's impossible to side with the suspect. Then, while you're rooting against the suspect, they're getting rid of the rule that you thought you liked.\footnote{Friedman and Lithwick, Watch as We Make This Law Disappear. How the Roberts Court disguises its conservatism, Slate October 4, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2269715/ (visited October 16, 2010).} 

While, of course, it is impossible to know the motives of Justices, Friedman may be overstating the intention of the Court. The question of whether Miranda rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived has always been determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case before the Court, including the background, experience, and conduct of the suspect.\footnote{Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.} This approach may be the best reading of Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins. In all four cases, suspects with experience dealing with law enforcement were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently willing to engage in conversations with the police.\footnote{Viewed in hindsight, these may not have been the wisest decisions. Yet all four suspects believed that they could gain some benefit from talking with the police.} 

\textbf{CONCLUSION} 

The four Miranda cases decided by the Supreme Court between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins all featured suspects who could fairly be described as frequent fliers. In deciding these four cases, the Court began a process of limiting Miranda from its original purpose of limiting the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations. Instead, the Court has begun a subtle shift towards focusing more responsibility of the subjective knowledge of suspects rather than the objective actions and tactics of the police.
In particular, the Court has started to implicitly consider the criminal background of suspects among the factors to be considered in determining whether a *Miranda* waiver and subsequent statement is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. By implicitly – and, someday, probably, explicitly – taking the criminal experience of the suspect into account along with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the Court may be engaging in a more realistic review into whether a waiver and statement were uncoerced.